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The Growth of Assets of Financia{ Intermediaries
The total assets of the financial intermediaries iiicludccl in this
study increased from $18 billion in1900 to $432 l)ilIiOtI in 1949.
The estimates in Table I may be regarded as representative of all
financial intermediaries since they cover all but a few types of
these institutions and the omitted types have relatively sinai!
assets. Table 2 shows that adding the two most important types
of these omitted institutionS would increase the totals of Table 1
by only 2 to 3 per cent for most benchmark dates. Although the
figures as a ruJe reflect book values, neither the absolute amounts
nor the percentage of increase would besubstantially different
were it 1:iossible to value all assets of financialintermediaries con-
sistently at their market prices.7
The average rate of increase for the entire period of almost
fifty years is about 6¼ per cent a year,8 a rate that implies a
doubling of assets every eleven years. The rate of growth during
the first three periods (i.e. from 1901 to 1912, 1913 to 1922, and
1923 to 1929) was close to this average, varying only between
6½ per cent in the first all(1 9 per cent in the second period.After
a decline to a rate of nearly 4 per cent a yearduring the Great
Depression the growth of assets was resumed in the mid-thirties,
This is due partly to the fact that the assets of investment companies and personal
trust departments, the two groups in which the difference between bookand market
values is relatively largest, arc alrea(ly on the market value basis.
If Federal Reserve banks are excluded from the tabulation for the reason that
their assets to a considerable extent duplicate those of the commercial banks, the
average rate of growth is slightly reduced (Irons 6.6 to 6.4 per Cent),but the pattern
remains essentially unchanged. The discussion will, therefore, be limited to over-all
figures. The figures excluding thc- Federal Reserve banks - and such exclusion















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2l90UI92):\'ery rough estimates based primarily on statistics of brokers'
borrowings(it. W. Goldsiti ith, ii Study of Saving in the United
States [Princeton University Press, 1954], Table D.8).
1933-1949:Rough estimates based on data for brokers and dealers carrying
E margin accounts (Federal Reserve JJulIetrsi, various issues); and
balance sheets of incorporated security dealers (Statistics of income
"Source Book").
31912, 1922:Rough estimates.
1929. 1933:Based on asets of sciccte(1 sates linancc companies as shown iii
S W. C. Plummer and R. A. Young, Finance Companies and Their




' first at about the average rate of 61/2 per cent a year, but from
1939 to 1945 at one as high as 111/2 per cent. The rate of growth
- in the relatively short period alter \Voi'ld \\Tar 11 for which the
p.9.
1939, 1945:From Statistics of Income 'Source Book." Figures include the two
subgroups of "sales finance" and "personal credit" companies
distinguished in the "Source Book,"
1949:Based on trend of assets in live large fiumauce companies which
account for nearly 50 per cent of total of group.
4Sum of columns 1 through 3.
5Suns of columns 2 and 3 divided by column 4,
figures are available was the lowest on recolil except for the Great
. 1)epi'ession-V,per cent a year. There is, however, no substan-











included itt i)ealers in i'znance Finance




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1900 S18.4 5.6 ... 519.0 3.2
1912 39.8 1.0 $0 40.8 2.5
1922 94.3 4.0 .3 98.6 4.4
V)29 1546 100 ')4 '670 74
0
1933 133.4 2.5 1.2 137.1 2.7
1939 195.0 2.0 2.7 199.7 2.4
a 1945 375.3 3M 1.2 379.5 1.1
1949 432.1 2.7 7.0 441.8 2.2I
before 1930 takentogether and the fifteenyears SinUC the endof the Great Depression.In both cases thetotal assets offinancial intermediaries increasedat an average rate of aI)out7 i/ per(Cflt a year.
The higures forthe total assets offinancial intermediariesare, like many economicseries, considerablyaffected by the-changes in the purchasingpower of the dollar duringthe last halfcentury. If theseare eliminated by deflatingall values bymeans of an index of the generalprice level (i.e.the so-calledgross national product deflator)the rate of growthof financialintermediaries, measured by theirtotal assets, is ofcourse considerablylower be- cause prices havetended upwardsthrough most ofthe last Fifty years. Reducedto 1929 prices thetotal assets offinancial inter- mediaries increasedfrom about $37billion in 1900to $287 l)illiOfl iii 1949. Theaverage annual rate ofincrease in 1929prices is equal to about¼ per cent, one-third lessthan the ratebased on unad- justed Figures.
Reduction toa stable price levelnot only sharplyreduces the average rate of growth,but also considerablychanges thepattern of growthover the past fivedecades. The firsttwo periods running from thebenchmarks of 1900to 1922, it istrue, again showa rate of growthvery close to theaverage for the entireperiod. The twenties, however,now stand outas a period ofextraordinarily rapid expansionof the assetsof financialintermediaries, thean- nual rate ofincrease between1922 and 1929 of½ per cent being 60 per centhigher than thatfor the nextrapl(1 period ofexpan- sion, thatbetween 1933 and1939. Deflationchanges the slowde- crease during theGreat Depressioninto a smallincrease. It also reduces therate of growthduring theI)erio(1 of WorldWar II to the average forthe entire halfcentury. Finally, ittransforms the relatively slowincrease after\Voi-ld War IIinto avery slight de- cline, the onlyone in the series ofdeflated values.These differ- ences in thepattern of growthbetween theunadjusted and deflated values ofthe totalassets of financial

















































iffer- is considerably more regular fordeflated than for current values
and and that an extrapolation of the rateof growth observed between
tand 1900 and 1922 for another quarterof a century would produce
wth approximately the figures actuallyobserved in the late forties.
The picture is not much changedif the total assets of financial













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to take accountof the growth in the scale of theAmerican econ-
omy (Table 3) .The annual rate of increase, onthis basis,is
reduced to slightly more than 254 per cent.The curve, however,
retains the essential features of thatof aggregate deflated values,
i.e. it has its most rapid increasein the twenties, and the values
for the middle of the century liereasonably close to an extrapola-
uon of the trendobserved from 1900 to 1922.
Total assets of main types of financialintermediaries
To understand the growth of the aggregateassets of all Financial
intermediaries, it is necessary to look atit in at least two ways:
from the point of view of the growthof the total assets of the two
dozen main types of financial intermediariesand from that of the
growth of the aggregate of about ten ofthe main forms of assets
held by all Financial intermediaries.
The rate of the growth of thedifferent financial intermediaries
has been very uneven. Indeed,of the twenty-one intermediaries
for which separate totals arepresented in this report, only eleven
were in operation - or atleast of even smallquantitative mi-
portance - in 1900. Twoof them began operations oracquired
any quantitativeimportance between 1900 and1912 - the Postal
Savings System and governmentlending institutions. Another
seven appear for thefirst time in the statistics of1922 - Federal
Reserve banks, private 1)eflSiOflfunds, federal insurance funds,
credit unions, investment companiesinvestment installment com-
panies, and land banks. The firstestimate for investment holding
companies is for 1929,although some of these companiesoperated
throughout, and in a few cases before,the twenties.
The total assets of thefinancial inteririediaries that have been
operated throughout the lasthalf century increased about seven-
teen times between1900 and 1949, or at an averageannual rate of
nearly 6 per cent. The aggregategrowth (1949 assets divided by
1900 assets) for the different types,arranged in ascending order,
is as follows:'0
In evaluating the multiples shownin this and the lollowing text table, aswell
as the average rates ofgrowth of assets calculated from them(using only the initial




State and localtrust funds omitted sinceamount in 1900 wasnegligible.
The ten financialintermediaries thusfall fairly naturallyinto four groups(see Chart 2) 11There is, first,a group consistingof mortgage companiesand mutual savingsbanks. the growthof which wasconsiderably slowerthan theaverage for allgroups of financialintermediaries alreadyin operation in1900, A second group, includingcommercial banks,their personaltrust depart.. ments, and fireinsurance companiesshow anaverage annualrate of growthclose to the 6per cent for theten-group aggregate. Three types ofintermediaries,including privatelife insurance companies andsavings and loanassociations, showan increase of assets between 1900and 1949 ofabout thirtytimes, whichcor- responds toan average rate ofgrowth of 7per cent a year.Two smallgroups - fraternal
insurance organizationsand casualtyin- surance companies- finally, have increasedtheir assets inthe last
and terminalyear of the period andthus assumingregular growththroughout it), two considerationsshould be kept inmind. First, theinitial and terminalyear of the period donot mark the beginningand the end ofthe growthprocess, hut only concentrate attentionon growth betweentwo years selectedpartly for statistical convenience and partlybecause they markturning points irsthe country'seconomic
affairs but notnecessarily in thelife of everygroup of financialintermediaries.
They are thereforemore appropriatefor somegroups than for others.Second,
higher rates ofgrowth aremore likely whenthe base figure- assets in the initial year - is small inabsolute amountthan when it islarge, i.e. forsmall rather than
for large gTOUsSof intermediariesand forgroups in their earlystage of deve1op rncnt rather than afterreaching maturity.
"The correspondingratio for investment
bankers andsecurity dealers,which can
be estimatedonly very roughly,is about 4.5,i.e. the secondlowest in thegroup of
eleven.
Mortgage companies
2.7 Mutual savings banks 8.8
Commercial banks Jr,7

































- I -Casualty and Miscellaneous Irisuronce Companies - 2. Fraternal Insurance 0rganiztions
Private Life Insurance Cornpanes
Mutual Accident Companies










half century by l)etwcen eighty and ninety times, which implies an
average annual rate of growth of al)OUt 9 per cent.

































34differed considerably in the speed of growth.The fast growers
among them include federal insurance funds, government lending
institutions, credit unions, and the Postal SavingsSystem. Invest-
ment Companies (except in the twenties) and land banks,on the
other hand, have grown rather slowlyor have even reached and
passed their peak within the period.'2
For most of the groups of financialintermediaries the rate of
growth in the twenty years after 1929 has beenconsiderably slower
than that in the preceding thirtyyears. Moreover, the ranking of
the different groups in accordance with theirrate of growth is in
many cases different for the last twenty years than for the entire
period since 1900 or since they began operations.
For the period between 1929 and 1949, when theaggregate
assets of all twenty-one groups increased 2.8 times, those ofa few
groups even declined; those of some others grew but little; while
some rose to ten or more times their 1929 size. These differences
in the rate of growth of the differentgroups of financial interinedi-
aries arc evident from the following tabulation which indicates
the ratio of assets at the end of 1949 to those of 1929:13
"This classification applies to the total for all types of illvestment companies.
It would alsc apply, and even more clearly so, to investment holding companies
and closed-end management investment companies. Opcn-cnd inscstnsent companies,
i.e. companies continuously issuing and redeeming their shares closeto or at their
net asset value, as well as investment installment (face value certificate) companies,
on the other hand, would have to be classified among the gioups growing rapidly, at
least after the Great Depression.
"The corresponding ratios may be roughly estimated at 0.3 for investment bankers
and security dealers (lower than for any of the twenty-one groups listed above) and
at 2.9 for finance companies (slightly above the aeragc for all groups).
Land banks 0.5
Mortgage compa flies 0.6
Investment holding coiiipanies 0.6
Itivestineist companies 1.0
Personal trust departments 1.7
Savings and loan associations 2.0
Fire insurance companies 2.1
Mutual savings banks 2.2
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Ratio scaleMutual accident companies 3,2
Private life insurance comJ)anies 3.1
Casualty and misc. insurance companies 3.5
Investment installment coinpauics 5.6
Federal Reserve banks 8.3
State and local trust funds 9.5
Private pension funds 13.7
Postal Savings System 19.0
Credit unions 19.7
Federal insurance funds 35.4
Government lending institutions 42.0
There is, however, a second aspect of the differences in the rates
of growth of assets of the various types of financial intermediaries,
and one in which such differences show up more promptly and
conspicuously. This is the distribution of the change between two
benchmark dates in the aggregate assets of all intermediaries
among the different groups of intermediaries as it is shown in
Table 414
The shares of the different groups in Table 4 naturally fluctuate
much more than those of Table 5, which are based on holdings
at benchmark dates. But both tables tell essentially the same story,
although Table 4 does it more dramatically and more appropri-
ate!)' if interest is centered on the flow of funds over the period'5
rather than on holdings at the start or end of the period. Table 4,
for instance, emphasizes the special character of the period after
World War II - the predominance of insurance organizations as
net suppliers of funds by financial intermediaries and the extraor-
dinarily small role of commercial banks - mUCh more than Table
5 does. Similarly, the high share of the banking system in the total
'4Negative percentages in Table 4 indicate either a dedine in the assets of one
group of intermediaries when aggrcgate assels of all intermediaries increase or, for
the period 1930.1933. an increase in a groups assets while those of all intermediaries
decline.
The changes between benchmark dates are, of course, not identical with the flow
of funds within the periodrevaluations, accruals and other non-cash entries
prevent that - but they are in ,nost periods (except for 1930.1933) a reasonably
satisfactory approximation to it, particularly if it is not the absolute amount of
the how of funds but only the relation between different groups of intermediaries
that is to be measured.
37TABLE4
Distribution of Changesin Total Assetsamong Main Groups of Financial
Intermediaries BetweenBenchmark Dates (per cent)
increase inassets of financialintermediaries duringwar inflations. or in the decreaseduring deepdepressions, standsout more clearly. The differencesbetween therates of growthof the various groups of financialintermediaries have,of course,ledto consid erable changesittthe distributionof the totalassets of all financial intermediariesamong the differentgroups (see Table5). These shifts aresummarized inChart 5, below,which showsthe trend of the shareof the fourmajorgroupsthe bankingsystem, in-
38
1901-1913-1923-1930-19.34-19.10-/94I- 1912192210291933 10301045/9ii I BanAing System
IFederal Reserve 9.6 .3-7.519.514.3 1.1) 2Gotnmercial 55.247.031.1 95.032.852.0 -4.7 3Mutual savings 7.44.75.4-4.2 1.82.97.9 4Postal Savings .1 .2 .1-5.0 .1 .9 .5 Total 62.761.637.0 78.354.270.24.7 11 Insurante
IPrivate life 12.57.814.6-16.213.58.626.0 2Fraternal .6 .6 .6 - .5 .4 .2 .5 3Private pension funds .. .2 .7 - .9 .61.07.0 4Federal )pcns.,retire-
meat, & soc.
, .21.4-5.63.99.920.3
5State & localjsec. funds .0 .2 .6-1.41.4 .83.2 6Fire and marine 1.71.62.4 4.0 1.0 .8 4.1 7Casualty and misc .7 .91.4 1.4 1.1 .83,7 8Mutual accidentassoc .0 .1 .1 .1 .0 .1 .2 Total 15.611.421.9-19.022.122.265.0 III .ifiscellaneousFinancial Inter-
mediaries
ISavings & loanassoc 2.2 3.47.6 7.1-1.1 1.910.5 2Credit unions
0 .1 0 .2 .1 .7 3Investment cos .. .24.7 8.2 .3 .51.0
4Investment holdingcon 7.2 12.4-.3 .4 .3
5Investmentinstallmentcos 0 .1-.1 .2 0 .1
6Mortgage cos .9 .4 .4 1.8 0ml .6 7Land banks
1.81.6 .2 .9- .7-'.4 8Govt. lending agencies 01.0-.4-12.77.3--.1 8.8 Total 3.06.821.2 17.07.52.121.5 IV PersonalT7ustDepartments 18.720.219.9 23.616.2 5.58.8 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0100.0surance, miscellaneousintermediaries, and personal trust depart-
ny. ments - in the aggregate forall financial intermediaries. Each of
otis the four groups shows a growth patternof its own. The share of
sid the banking system has declinedsteadily except for an interrup-
ial tion during World War II.Personal trust departments show a
cse slight increasetipto 1929, but declined duringthe last two decades,
nd particularly since World War II. Themiscellaneous group like-
in- wise has increased its share up to 1929,but has decreased it during
ancicjl
TASLE 5




I Federal Reserve 5.63.55.39.812.010.5
1.0 2 Commercial 54.554.950.442.934,634.042.736.4
4.7 3 Mutual savings 13.210.17.06.4 8.1 6.14.55.0
7.9 4 Postal Savings .1 .1 .1 .9 .7 .8 .8
.5 Total 67.765.063.152.948.850.560.052.7
4.7 If Insurance
I Private life 9.511.19.211.315.715.011.913.8
26.0 2 Fraternal life .2 .4 .5 .5 .7 .6 .4 .5
.5 3 Private pension funds .1 .3 .5 .5 .8 1.6
7.0 4 Federalpens., retire-.. . .1 .6 1.6 2.36.07.9
20.3 5 State & nicnt, & soc.
localJsec. funds .1 0 .2 .3 .6 .9 .8 1.1
3.2 6 Fire and marine 2.2 1.9 1.72.0 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.5
4.1 7 Casualty and misc. .3 .5 .7 1.0 .9 1.0 .91.3
3.7 8 Mutual accident assoc. .1 .1 .1 .1 0 0 .1 .1
.2 Total 12.314.112.516,221.821.922.027.7
65.0 III Miscellaneous Financial
Intennedianes
I Savings & loan assoc 2.72.43.04.84.4 2.72.33.4
10.5 2 Credit unions 0 0 0 .1 .1 .2
.7 3 Investment cos .1 1.9 .9 .7 .6 .7
1.0 4 Investment holding cos. 2.8 1.3 .8 .6 .6
.3 5 Investment installment
.1 cos 0 0 .1 .1 .1 .1
.6 6 Mortgage cos 1.0 .9 .6 .5 .3 .2 0 .1
7 Land banks 1.0 1.31.4 1.3 .3 .2
8.8 8 Govt. lending agencies. .. 0 .6 .22.2 3.82.02.8
21.5 Total 3.63.3 5.311.510.79.76.08.1
8.8 IV Personal Trust Departments 16.317.619.119.418.718.012.011.6
00.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0a
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I 1922 19291933 1939 19451949
most of thefollowingtwenty years.The shareof insuranceorgan-
izations,on the otherhand, hasbeen risingfairly steadily,particu- larly in thetwenties andafter WorldWar II. Thesemovements, andstill morethe upsand downsin the shares ofindividualgroups ofintermediaries,are, ofcourse, theresult of manifold forces, both those peculiar to one group of
aries institutions and those of more general 5c01)C. One of these general
forces deserves particular stress - the influence of inflation and
deflation. The share of tile banking system iii the total assets of
financial intermediaries increases- compared to its secular down-
ward trench - during war inflation and declines particularly rap-
idly during deflation. This is not unexpected since the main
characteristic of inflation and deflation is a particularly sharp ex-
pansion and contraction of money and credit, i.e. essentially the
assets and liabilities of the banking system. These movements are
reflected, but as a rule only in attenuated form, in the assets and
liabilities of the other types of financial intermediaries. The in-
fluence of inflation and deflation is slowest and least J)ronounccd
for those intermediaries whose liabilities are predominantly the
result of a stock of 01(1 contracts and who invest their funds in
assets with a value not fluctuating widely in accordance with the
general price level. Insurance organizations are the outstandi tig
representatives of this type of financial institution. As expected,
their share declines, or remains unchanged, during inflations (see
the behavior for the periods 1913-1922 and 1940-1945 in Chart 5)
and increases rapidly during depressions. Personal trust depart-
ments might be excepted to increase their share during infla-
tion and decrease it during deflation because of the relatively
high share of COflifliOfl stock among their assets. These movements
are not visible in Chart 5, apparently because they have been offset
by long-term movements, particularly the low rate of growth -
relative to other types of financial interiiiediaries - of personal
trust depamnents since 1929.
A different type of basic movement is reflected in the trend of
the share of public intermediaries, shown in Table 6. 'They re-
mained insignificant until 1929 iF the Federal Reserve banks are
excluded, their share not exceeding 2 per cent at any benchmark
date. Even if the Federal Reserve banks are included, the share
of pUl)lic intermediaries until 1929 was only up to 7 per cent,
From then on the increase is sharp. The share is already above 11
c per cent in 1933; it jumps to 18 per cent by 1939; and by 1949
reaches 23 per cent. If the Federal Reserve banks are excluded,
41*
TABLE 6
Privale and Pub'icFinancial Intermediaries,Total Assets
Shor,'of
Public Intcrmcdiw iccPublic Intesmediaries
Column
IIncludes investmentbankers andfinance companies.(From Table 2.) 2 Column Iminus column3. 3Federal Reserveand PostalSavings Systems;Federal Landnanks; government pension, retirementand social security
funds; governmentlending institutions. (From Table Ideducting fromline 111.7assets of joiiststockland banks.)
4 Column3 excludingFederal Reservebanks. (FrontTable 1.)
5.6Columns 5 and4, respectively,divided by column1.
the sharerises from 2per cent in 1929to 9 per centin 1939and to 13 percent in 1949,first largelyas a result of theexpansion ofgo'- ernment lendinginstitutionsduring andimmediatelyafter the Great Depressionand laterchiefly becauseof thecontinued and substantialgrowth ingovernment insurancefunds.'°
Main typesof assets ofall financial
intermediaries Between 1900and 1949none of the maintypes of assetsdeclined in absoluteamount, i.e. incurrent dollarsunadjustedfor price level changes(see Table7). Differences in therate of growthwere, nevertheless,very pronounced.Againstan averagegrowth oftotal assets duringthe halfcentury of 24times,some types ofassets increased lessthan 10 timesand oneimportanttype (UnitedStates The assets ofpublic intermediariesdo not include

























$.O 1912 40.8 40.7 .1 .1 .2 .2 1922 98.6 91.7 6.9 1.7 7.0 1,7 1929 167.0 158.3 8.7 3.2 5.2 1.9
1933 137.1 121.4 15.7 8.6 11.5 6.3
1939 199.7 163.4 36.3 17.3 18.2 8.7
1945 379.5 297.6 81.9 37.0 21.6 9.7



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1government securities) multiplied byas much as 270 times.The wide range of rates of growthis evident from thefo!lowiugtable, which shows all holdings ofthe main types olassets at the endf 1949 as multiples of those o[1900 and breaks theincrcase (h)Wfl into that occurring beforeand after 1929.
44







21.6 6.0 'LI Miscellaneous assets 13.2 9.7 1.4 Sborttcrni loans 8.8 6.1 LI Mortgages
12.8 8.5 1.5 Un fled Statesgovernment securities 269.9 12.8 2L1 Stare and localgovernment securities 15.3 7.6 2.0 Corporate and foreign bonds 15.0 9.0 1.7 Stocks
33.4 22.8 1.5 langible assets












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0of all financial iflter,1)c(Iiarjes,as derived from their combined
balance sheet shown in Table8, were rather small. Cash and mis-
cellancous assets accountc4 forabout one-sixth of total assets.
It is, of course, thedistribution of the remaining five-sixths which
is of primaryeconomic interest. Among them the only substantial
change was the increasein the share of United Statesgovernment
securities to 9 pet-cent of total assets in 1922 from only a few per
cent before World War I.Short-term loans accounted forover
one-fourth of totalassets at the three benchniark dates of 1900,
1912, and 1922;mortgages for about one-fifth; and corporate bonds
for approximatel)?one-seventh, These three main outlets thus
absorbed about three-fiftJsof total assets and nearly three-quarters
of the non-cashassets of all financial intermediaries. Stocksand
state and localgovernment securities each accounted for between
5 and 8 percent at the three benchmark dates, whilethe share of
tangible assets- primarily the buildings in which the intermedi-
aries conducted theirbusinessdeclined from 5 to 3per cent.
The first considerableshifts in the structure ofassets occurred
in the twenties. Themost important was the decline in theshare of short-term loansbetween 1922 and 1929from 26 to 22 per cent. It was evenmore pronounced in short-term businessloans, from 20 to 14per cent. In the same period, loanson securities and
Consumer loans actually increasedtheir share of totalassets from 6 to 8 per cent. UnitedStates government securitiesfell sharply from 9 to 6per cent as holdings acquired duringWorld War I were liquidated. Thesedeclines were offset byincreases in the proportion of total assetsrepresented by stocks and bymortgage loans. The increase inthe share of stocks from8 to 14 per cent of
total assets reflected bothrising stock prices'and the entry of several groups of financialintermediaries which investmainly in stocks: investment andinvestment holdingcompanies. it is little influenced by an increase inthe proportion ofstocks among the assets of the oldest and largestfinancial institutions,particularly
ITwill be recalled that theassets of those groups of financialintermediaries which held the largestamounts of stock, i.e. personaltrust departments andinvestment companies, are valued at market prices.If stock held by otherintermediaries, par- ticularly property insurancecompanies, were revaluedat market prices, the Increase in the proportion ofassets represented by stocks wouldbe still morepronouncetj
46commercial banks and life insurance companies. The risein the
share of mortgage loans from 1 8to 20 per cent of total assets is a
reflection of the building boom of the twenties.
Changes in the structure of assets during theGreat Depression
were in part a continuation of the trends begun in the twenties,
primarily the further decline in the share of short-termloans from
22 to 17 per cent. The reduction in theproportion of tOtal assets
represented by stocks from 14 to 10per cent reflects mostly the
fall in stock prices. The increase in the shareo. United States
government securities from 6 to 12 per cent- well above the level
of 1922 and possibly the highest pointup to that time and in that
of state and local government securities from 5to 7 per cent are
both expressions of the tendency to shift into themost liquid and
least risky interest-bearing assets available. The rise in the share
of tangible assets from 3 to 5 per cent,on the other hand, is not
the result of deliberate investment policy bitt of the necessity of
foreclosing mortgaged properties.
The decline of the share of short-term loans continued between
1933 and 1939. At the end of the period they represented as little
as 10 per cent of total assets, less than one-half of their share in
1922. Mortgages, whose share had held up fairly well until the
early thirties, now declined sharply from 20 to 14 per cent of total
assets, partly the result of the exchange for Home Owners Loan
Corporation and Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation bonds. The
trend towards liquid and safe assets continued and was evidenced
in the increasing share of United States government securities
and cash. The share of corporate bonds declined, though only
slightly, and that of stocks remained stationary because the abso-
lute increase in these holdings did not keep pace with the growth
of total assets.
World War II produced sharper changes in the structure of
assets of financial intermediaries than had been experienced in
any previous period. At its end United States government securi-
ties alone had come to represent 50 per cent and United States
government securities phis cash almost 70 per cent of total assets.
The share of all other assets necessarily declined sharply. In the
four years after the end of l9'Ib, there were clear indications of a
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tendency to return, orat least to get nearer. to the prewarstructure of assets. It may therefore bepreferable to COmpare thedistrib tion of assets in 1919 with thatofI 939 without regardto the in
terveiiing benchmark of 1945.Even then there remainsa Shar1) increase in the share ofUnited Statesgovernment securities from less than 20 to 40per cent of total assets, which is onlyoffset toa small extent by the redLictionof cash froni 22to 16 percent. The share of short-termloans remainedat approximate1)one- tenth of totalassets. That of stocks declined onlymoderately from 10 to 7 per cent, theresistance being due to therise in stockprices. Reductions also occurred inthe share ofmortgages, corijorate bonds, state and localgovernment securities, andtangil)Je assets, the decline in the lattercase reflecting the liquidationof the holU ings of foreclosedproperties.
Considering the entireperiod of nearly halfa century, five main trends appear:
I. A decline,substantial and reasonablysteady since theearly twenties, of the shareof short-term loans,particularly thoseto business.
A lesspronounced and rather irregulardecline in the shareof mortgage holdings.
A sharp increase,particularly since theGreat Depressiot,in the share ofassets invested in UnitedStatesgovernment securities, A decline, thoughgenerally beginningonly with thethirties, in the share ofcorporate bonds andstate and localgovernmeit sec ui-i ties.
A concave trendin the share ofcorporate stock, increasing up to 1929 and decliningover the last twodecades. Thesemovements reflect twoforces. The firstchange isin the investmentpolicies of financialintermediaries whichmay be due to changesin statutesor regulationsto changes inscope and methods of operationsor to managenlemitdecisiotis reflectingjudg. menus onprospectiVe yieldrates, asset prices,and default risks. While thisreport is notconcerned withany of these changesand their effectson the assetstructure of financialintermediariessome may conic underscrutiny in themain study. Thesecond set of forces is theaggregate supply of thedifferent typesof assets. Again
48it is not within the purview of this report to analyze the factors
that have cleteimined the supply of these assets in theeconomy but
oniy to compare the holdings of financial institmions with the
total supply. This task will be taken up in thenext section.
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